Current Issue : July - September Volume : 2018 Issue Number : 3 Articles : 5 Articles
In this paper, we consider a novel game theory model for the competitive influence\nmaximization problem. We model this problem as a simultaneous non-cooperative game with\ncomplete information and rational players, where there are at least two players who are supposed\nto be out of the network and are trying to institutionalize their options in the social network;\nthat is, the objective of players is to maximize the spread of a desired opinion rather than the\nnumber of infected nodes. In the proposed model, we extend both the Linear Threshold model\nand the Independent Cascade model. We study an influence maximization model in which users�\nheterogeneity, information content, and network structure are considered. Contrary to previous\nstudies, in the proposed game, players find not only the most influential initial nodes but also the\nbest information content. The proposed novel game was implemented on a real data set where\nindividuals have different tendencies toward the players� options that change over time because of\ngaining influence from their neighbors and the information content they receive. This means that\ninformation content, the topology of the graph, and the individual�s initial tendency significantly\naffect the diffusion process. The proposed game is solved and the Nash equilibrium is determined\nfor a real data set. Lastly, the numerical results obtained from the proposed model were compared\nwith some well-known models previously reported in the literature....
This essay asks how religion and theological ideas might be made manifest in video\ngames, and particularly the creation of video games as a religious activity, looking at contemplative\nexperiences in video games, and the creation and world-building of game worlds as a form of\nTolkienian subcreation, which itself leads to contemplation regarding the creation of worlds....
This study examines the effects of initial endowment size on individual behavior in a\nbinary choice game with no dominant strategy. Subjects make decisions in two, theoretically identical\nsequences, differing in initial endowment levels only. Each decision involves a choice between an\noption with a certain loss and an option with a loss that is increasing in the number of individuals\nwho choose it. For the higher endowment level, all subjects are guaranteed a positive payoff. For the\nlower endowment level, subjects who choose the uncertain loss option could receive a negative\npayoff. The results indicate that in the first round of play, subjects with the higher endowment level\nchoose the certain loss option significantly more often than subjects with the lower endowment level.\nThere are, however, no significant differences in behavior beyond the first few rounds of play....
In this paper, we present an application of the dynamic tracking games framework to a\nmonetary union. We use a small stylized nonlinear three-country macroeconomic model of a monetary\nunion to analyze the interactions between fiscal (governments) and monetary (common central\nbank) policy makers, assuming different objective functions of these decision makers. Using the\nOPTGAME algorithm, we calculate solutions for several games: a noncooperative solution where each\ngovernment and the central bank play against each other (a feedback Nash equilibrium solution),\na fully-cooperative solution with all players following a joint course of action (a Pareto optimal\nsolution) and three solutions where various coalitions (subsets of the players) play against coalitions\nof the other players in a noncooperative way. It turns out that the fully-cooperative solution yields the\nbest results, the noncooperative solution fares worst and the coalition games lie in between, with a\nbroad coalition of the fiscally more responsible countries and the central bank against the less thrifty\ncountries coming closest to the Pareto optimum....
Voters whose yes-or-no decision never makes a difference to the outcome in a simple voting\ngame are known as ââ?¬Å?null playersââ?¬Â. Luxembourgââ?¬â?¢s role in the Council of Ministers during the first\nperiod of the European Economic Community (EEC) is often cited as a real-world case. The paper\ncontrasts the textbook claim that Luxembourg was a null player with a more comprehensive picture\nof Luxembourgââ?¬â?¢s role in EECââ?¬â?¢s voting system. The assessment of Luxembourgââ?¬â?¢s voting power is\nsensitive to the role played by the European Commission in the decision-making procedure and the\nmeasurement concepts underlying power evaluations....
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